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Boraz: Maritime Domain Awareness

MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS
Myths and Realities
Commander Steven C. Boraz, U.S. Navy

Maritime Domain Awareness is where it all begins. We cannot conduct
the operations that we must if we don’t have a good sense of what’s out
there, moving on, above or under the sea.
ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD, IN RHUMB LINES, 20 AUGUST

2007

I

t was not long after the attacks of September 11th that government officials began discussing other avenues that terrorists might use to attack American citizens, particularly in the maritime domain. In a speech delivered in January 2002,
President George W. Bush noted, “The heart of the Maritime Domain Awareness program is accurate information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels, cargo, and people extending well beyond our traditional
1
maritime boundaries.” By November 2002 Congress had passed the Maritime
2
Transportation Security Act of 2002. The National Security Council and the
president continued to explore issues surrounding the safety and security of the
U.S. maritime environs. In December 2004, the president signed National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13,
which established policy guidelines. It also directed the secretaries of Homeland
Security and Defense to lead the federal effort in developing a comprehensive
national strategy that would better integrate and synCommander Boraz, an eighteen-year veteran of the
U.S. Navy’s intelligence community, is currently the
chronize existing department-level strategies and enAssistant Program Manager for Maritime Domain
sure their effective and efficient implementation. The
Awareness at Program Executive Office, Command,
interagency Maritime Security Policy Coordinating
Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence in San Diego, California. He served as a Federal
Committee was established to serve as the primary foExecutive Fellow at the RAND Corporation from 2004
rum for coordinating government maritime security
to 2005. He has published in several professional jourpolicies; it delivered a National Strategy for Maritime
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to Democratic Control and Effectiveness (Austin: UniSecurity in September 2005.3 Eight additional plans,
versity of Texas Press, 2007).
including the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Do4
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main Awareness, buttress the national strategy.
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In response, the departments of Homeland Security, Transportation, and Defense identified executive agents to lead their efforts toward achieving maritime
domain awareness (MDA): the Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and
the Navy, respectively.
The Coast Guard has recently established the Nationwide Automatic Identification System, a robust command-and-control network designed to improve
maritime safety and security at the nation’s highest-priority ports and coastal
zones. Customs and Border Protection, another Homeland Security agency, has
the Container Security Initiative and the Customs-Trade Partnership against
5
Terrorism (C-TPAT).
The Maritime Administration helped develop the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS), participates in the MDA executive steering
committee, and is tasked by Congress to be the “Information Advocate of the
6
Marine Transportation System.”
7
The Navy, for its part, has pushed the concept of the “thousand-ship navy”;
at least one senior advocate has declared that “it is virtually indisputable that
MDA is the enabling mission supporting Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing,
8
and is a primary focus of what FORCEnet will ultimately do.” MDA is a key
component in the Navy’s new maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower, which notes, “To be effective, there must be a significantly increased commitment to advance maritime domain awareness (MDA). . . . Maritime forces will contribute to enhance information sharing, underpinning and
energizing our capability to neutralize threats to our Nation as far from our
9
shores as possible.”
The Secretary of the Navy has deemed MDA important enough to direct the
service to develop a “cross-functional team” from the operational staff and acquisition communities to implement an initial MDA capability in the Central
and Pacific Command areas of responsibility and on the west coast of the United
States by August 2008; the secretary committed more than $300 million to doing
10
so. There are literally hundreds more public and commercial MDA-related activities being developed.
MDA is also a contemporary debate topic. This journal, for example, has provided ample space to the maritime strategy and MDA, and it routinely publishes
11
articles regarding maritime security. Also, maritime security figures promi12
nently in literature issued by think tanks.
Even without such extensive and varied activity, it would be clear that MDA is
a cornerstone of national security, as more than 80 percent of the world’s trade
13
travels by water. Nonetheless, operators, acquisition professionals, defense
contractors, and policy makers still find maritime domain awareness a difficult
idea. This is the case because of widespread misperceptions about what it takes
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to achieve MDA, who should implement it, where, and how. This article is intended to address and clear away some of those stumbling blocks.
Myth: “The Navy Has Always ‘Done’ MDA”
The reality is that navies of the world, both ancient and modern, have always
gathered data on their maritime environments to gain situational awareness
that their missions required, whether basic navigation or finding an enemy armada and stopping it before it could attack. Many argue that there has simply
been a change in the details; in fact, however, that would be akin to saying humanity had been “doing” physics before Isaac Newton—the context of the MDA
we’ve been “doing” and that of the MDA we need to achieve are vastly different.
This is true for three reasons.
First, the scale of “doing” MDA has dramatically expanded; massive
amounts of data on all aspects of maritime activity must be collected, then
cross-referenced, “fused” (generally speaking, correlated across sources), and
analyzed, in order to detect anomalies that may indicate threat-related behav14
ior. The computing power required is inordinately greater than the capacity
of the “grey matter” of those keeping watch. For example, during the Cold War
probably fewer than a thousand ships were tracked globally at any one time. Today, hundreds of thousands of ships need to be tracked and the links among
their cargoes, crews, and financial transactions sorted out. The November 2008
seaborne attacks on Mumbai represent a vivid case in point. The attackers hijacked an Indian fishing trawler, the Kuber, which routinely traveled to Mumbai
from a port in Gujarat State near the India-Pakistan border. Approximately 950
trawlers, carrying eight thousand fishermen, come to Mumbai every year, over
15
an eight-month period beginning in August. Making the connections between
these trawlers and the terrorists who may take advantage of such logistics networks requires much more than “what we’ve always been doing.”
Second, the U.S. Navy has let the arts of understanding regional maritime activity and determining trends therein atrophy. For years, this was a mission assigned to Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facilities and Centers (FOSIFs
and FOSICs). Staffed with naval intelligence professionals, “operators,” and civilian analysts, they provided in-depth analysis of the activities of the navies
(and some air forces) in all the maritime environs in which the U.S. Navy operated.16 In the restructuring that resulted from the demise of the Soviet Union
and a new U.S. emphasis on joint structures, the missions that FOSIFs and
FOSICs had once met were transferred to Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs).
Whether because the maritime environment has changed so drastically—that is,
no Soviet navy—or because, as some contend, the centers simply ignore maritime issues and focus their intelligence support on combatant commanders (i.e.,
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of unified, or interservice, regional or functional commands) rather than operational forces, is immaterial. The result is less support to naval forces. The
emerging “Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Centers”
(MHQ/MOC) concept may fill the gap. MHQ/MOC envisions a global network
17
of Navy-maritime organizations in support of national requirements. The initial plan establishes MHQs for each of the “numbered fleets” (e.g., the Seventh
Fleet in the western Pacific Ocean, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, etc.). A
“concept of operations” argues:
A key element of both homeland defense and maritime security overseas is achieving
and maintaining global maritime intelligence integration (GMII) and maritime domain awareness (MDA), which will require integrating various local and regional estimates within a global context. Maritime forces are a key element in this layered
defense of national interests, both in the forward regions and in the approaches to
the continental United States, where the objective is “to detect, deter, and, if necessary, defeat threats en route—before they reach the United States.”18

Applied regional MDA expertise, then, is urgently needed. Imagine, in a
war-fighting context, having to determine the intention of a particular merchant ship for the commander of the Seventh Fleet, or of the entire Pacific Fleet,
and “turning on the MDA switch” to do so—only to find the circuit not connected. When the Soviet navy was at sea, teams kept checklists on its specific activities, past and present; they knew what each one meant and had a very good
idea as to what would follow. Today, in contrast, the U.S. Navy does not have the
intelligence, operational, intellectual, or technical capacity to support MDArelated missions at the operational level of war. Part of the shortfall is being addressed by new programs, as well as by the reestablishment of the Advanced
Maritime Operational Intelligence Course at the Center for Naval Intelligence in
Dam Neck, Virginia, but these very initiatives are evidence that the gap exists.
Third, the way the Navy views commercial merchant traffic (traditionally
color coded as “white”) has changed. White shipping used to be a navigational
and watch-keeping problem—something not to collide with or at which not to
direct missiles. Now it is a potential threat as evinced by the al-Qa‘ida attacks on
the USS Cole in 2000 and the crude-oil carrier M/V Limburg in 2002, the
Mumbai attacks, and numerous acts of piracy off the Horn of Africa, in the
Malacca Strait, and elsewhere.
Myth: “MDA Is All about ‘White’ Shipping”
In reality, maritime domain awareness is about considerably more than white
shipping. As we have seen, it puts white shipping in an entirely different light;
however, MDA is “the effective understanding of anything associated with the
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global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or envi19
ronment of the United States.” Maritime domain awareness means finding the
ships and submarines of friends and foes, understanding the entire supply chain
of cargoes, identifying people aboard vessels, understanding the infrastructures
within or astride the maritime domain, and identifying anomalies and potential
threats in all these areas. Naval officers, however, focus more often than not on
security aspects; for them, MDA boils down to a maritime targeting issue. “Targeting,” in this sense, does not always involve a “kinetic effect” (a weapon striking an object). It may mean pointing out to a boarding team a merchant vessel
that it should strike up a conversation with; identifying a cargo carrier as suspect
so it can be held offshore for inspection; understanding the flows of personnel
and cargo at a shore facility; or, when a kinetic targeting solution is required,
picking out the wheat from the chaff.
Myth: “MDA Is Too Amorphous a Concept to Be Useful”
In reality—and while maritime domain awareness certainly has different meanings for Captains of Ports, masters of ships, and everyone in between—the common requirements of safety, security, the economy, and the environment
resonate among all its stakeholders. This was evident at the MDA Connectivity
Workshop conference held in Newport, Rhode Island, in August 2007 and attended by representatives of Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, NATO, New
Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The international attendees agreed that “maritime domain awareness” was a flawed rubric
and that implied links to the U.S. global war on terror were worrisome. But their
primary maritime-security concerns were surprisingly similar: terrorism, illegal
migration, piracy, illegal exploitation of natural resources, illegal activity in protected areas, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and the need for security and environmental protection. That is, admittedly, a broad range of issues, but the fact
that so many disparate nations share them testifies to the importance of maritime domain awareness and the prospects for partnerships to achieve it.
Myth: “MDA Is All about the Blips on My Monitor”
The reality is that MDA is not just about the blips; it’s about whether the blips
matter. Aggregating disparate data sets to generate a useful operational picture is
an increasingly complex task because of the massive amounts of data available
on all aspects of maritime activity. Fusing and analyzing those data may find
anomalies that point to threat activity of interest to decision makers. The Navy’s
formal MDA concept lays it out as an equation: that maritime domain awareness
equals global maritime situational awareness (the blips) plus maritime threat
20
awareness (whether the blips matter).
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Myth: “All We Need for MDA Is AIS”
The Automatic Identification System, or AIS, is indeed a reality. It uses a signal—a transponder-based collision-avoidance system that transmits and receives real-time navigational information via VHF line-of-sight radio—that can
be shared freely at the unclassified level. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) mandates its use on all passenger ships, tankers, and all other ships
21
of three hundred gross tons and above. AIS is a critical technology that enables MDA. Its use has spawned navigational information networks and
“clearinghouses” in many nations; it is a key component of MSSIS; and it is
22
available commercially.
However, the Automatic Identification System has its weaknesses. It can be
spoofed, its use is loosely enforced (if at all), and it provides information only on
ships mandated by the IMO; potential foes know how to use it, or not use it, so as
to hide their whereabouts. Moreover, due to the nature of the underlying communications protocol (known as “time-division multiplexing”) that AIS employs, signal degradation in high-density environments limits the usefulness of
the system as well as the value of its proposed use on smaller ships. Strategic
partners have produced technical solutions that overcome this liability, by
means of the Global Packet Radio Service, a system in use for many mobile
phones.
The underlying issue is that neither AIS nor any other “silver bullet” will
achieve maritime domain awareness. MDA requires all manner of sensors, databases, data sharing, decision aids, displays, etc. Without databases that can be
rapidly and adaptively searched to develop trends on specific ships, AIS does little more than “spam” the maritime “common operational picture” with more
and more blips.
Myth: “MDA Can Be Done Entirely at the Unclassified Level”
The reality is that our ability to find, fix, track, and target is considerably enhanced
when classified or sensitive information is applied. There is no doubt that much of
the information available to achieve maritime domain awareness is unclassified.
Programs like the Container Security Initiative, C-TPAT, MSSIS, and of course
AIS have been of considerable benefit to safety and security in the maritime domain. But how often will operational decisions be made on the basis of what is essentially a navigational-hazard and ship-avoidance system? As Vice Admiral John
Morgan and Commander Bud Wimmer point out, “Maritime Domain Awareness
is all about generating actionable intelligence, the cornerstone of successful
23
counterterrorist and maritime law enforcement operations.” While unclassified
information can contribute significantly to “awareness” per se, producing
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actionable intelligence generally requires classified or sensitive information not
available in the public domain.
Myth: “We Can Just Build Something like ICAO for the Maritime Domain”
In reality, the maritime domain has unique compliance challenges, based on culture and competitive advantage. The International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations agency, codifies principles and techniques and
24
sets standards to facilitate border crossing for international civil aviation. According to some, the IMO should be able to do the same for the maritime
environment.
ICAO standards are based on the Chicago Convention of 1945–47, a document that was agreed upon only two decades after the birth of international air
travel and so influenced its formative years. To speak of something similar in the
maritime domain fails to take into account that freedom of the seas has been a
critical aspect of commercial trade and an international standard for well over
two millenniums.
Moreover, commercial practice makes the analogy between the maritime and
air domains a poor one. Airplanes file flight plans, take off, and land. Ships file
sailing plans and depart but then, in a single extended voyage, may change flags,
change owners, change names, sell cargo, change their destinations, all in an attempt to make, or not lose, money in a volatile, highly competitive shipping
market, and while other ships are trying to do the same.
While the development of international standards for the maritime domain
based on those now in effect for the air is a laudable goal and may be possible
someday, those who argue for them tend to forget that cultural change takes
time, usually proportionate to how long a culture has been in place. Further, the
cost would likely meet with substantial resistance from many nations. Establishing ICAO-like standards in the maritime domain is simply not achievable in the
near term.
Myth: “MDA Can Be Done Virtually”
The reality is that much of what the United States has learned since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 points to the legal and cultural restrictions that hamper its ability to share information. There is little doubt that no single entity or
agency can be responsible for, or has the capacity to coordinate, all MDA-related
activity. That fact, coupled with modern network-centric information capabilities, leads to a strong argument that “nodes” generating maritime situational
awareness must be linked and that some MDA functions must be done virtually.
The present approaches that have worked best include those of the National
Counterterrorism Center (in McLean, Virginia), the National Counterproliferation Center (in Washington, D.C.), and the Joint Interagency Task Forces (West
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and South), because they put people and systems from different agencies into the
same physical structures. This enables (in fact, forces) information sharing while
ensuring that information does not cross information-security boundaries.
This brick-and-mortar solution might be applied to MDA in the form of
what might be called “maritime interagency task forces.” They would combine
elements of MHQ/MOCs, numbered-fleet command centers, the U.S. Coast
Guard’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers, and unified combatant commands and might initially be staffed by those entities. They would also need appropriate operations and intelligence specialists from various government
agencies (some of them already in the combatant commands), selected allied nations, and commercial liaisons. The mission would be to deliver regionally focused expertise and operational support, for areas of responsibilities roughly
coinciding with those of the numbered fleets.
This would require a hard look at existing structures both within and outside the
continental United States, in particular the relationship among MHQ/MOCs, Joint
Intelligence Operation Centers in each of the combatant commands, and Maritime
Intelligence Fusion Centers. For instance, the maritime security mission of the Joint
Intelligence Operation Center significantly overlaps that of the MHQ/MOC, especially overseas. Given today’s resource constraints, combining people and missions
is worth considering. The same can be said for centers within the United States itself,
where the Coast Guard fusion centers would need to be accounted for as well.
Aside from the need for increased information sharing and better support to
operational forces, new tactics, techniques, and procedures would naturally flow
from these maritime interagency task forces. While technology will certainly
help, increased maritime domain awareness is virtually meaningless without the
tools needed by the decision makers who must carry out operational responses.
This is a key point, one that cross-functional teams have repeatedly made.
To be sure, “federation” across maritime stakeholders (that is, a division of labor) will continue to be required. It is also of utmost import to get “reachback”
capabilities right—the ability of deployed forces to call, very quickly, upon the
full informational and analytical resources of intelligence commands back
home. That reachback needs to be as responsive to fleets as the FOSICs and
FOSIFs once were. Setting up regional “centers of maritime excellence” with the
right people, equipment, and training would be a step in the right direction.
Maritime domain awareness is neither tracks on a screen, systems that monitor
white shipping, (unachievable) international standards, nor something maritime security forces have always done. Nor is it easily achieved. But achieving
maritime domain awareness is critically important in today’s geopolitical context, not just to guard against international terrorism but to promote commerce

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss3/10

8

Boraz: Maritime Domain Awareness
BORAZ

145

and safety and to respond to natural disasters, piracy, illegal migration, and arms
smuggling.
MDA is an important part of this nation’s security strategy, and achieving
it will require new thinking regarding the roles of national and international
maritime-security forces. Establishing “maritime interagency task forces,” or
something similar, will go a long way toward that goal. But whatever means it
chooses, the United States is a maritime nation in a maritime world—achieving
maritime domain awareness is a twenty-first-century strategic imperative.
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